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The Ohio Mortmain Statute-
As Amended
Richard W. Schwartz
The recent amendment to the Ohio mortmain statute has liberalized
the harsh terms of the former law. After tracing the history of mort-
mare statutes, the author briefly compares the provisions of both the
original and the amended Ohio law with similar statutes in other lurts-
dictions. Mr. Schwartz concludes that in several areas the amendment
has cured many previously-existing inequities but cautions the reader that
some restrictions still remain. He expresses the hope that the amend-
ment is a forerunner of the complete abolition of the mortmain statute.
3 N THOSE JURISDICTIONS where the legislatures have adopted
mortmain statutes,1 the statutes seem to have taken one of the
following four forms: (1) to limit the amount that can be devised
or bequeathed to charities;2 (2) to render such dispositions invalid
if drawn into the testator's will
within a prescribed period of
THm AUTHOR (B.A., University of time before his death;' (3) to
Michigan, LL.B., Western Reserve Un- mpose both of these restrc-
versity) is a practicing attorney in Cleve-
land, Ohio. tions;4 or (4) to render such
dispositions partially invalid if
drawn into the testator's will
within a prescribed period of time before his death.'
Until this past legislative session, Ohio followed the second
view expressed above.6 However, under the recent amendment to
the Ohio mortmain statute which became effective on October
I Eleven jurisdictions have enacted mortmain statutes. These jurisdictions include
District of Columbia, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana,
New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
2 Iowa and New York.
3 District of Columbia, Florida, Pennsylvania.
4 California, Georgia, Idaho, and Mississippi.
5 Ohio and Montana.
6 114 Ohio Laws 320, 346 (1932). The previous mortmain statute read as follows:
If a testator dies leaving issue, or an adopted child, or the lineal descendants
of either, and the will of such testator gives, devises, or bequeaths such tes-
tator's estate, or any part thereof, to a benevolent, religious, educational, or
charitable purpose, or to any state or country, or to a county, municipal cor-
poration, or other corporation, or to an association in any state or country, or
to persons, municipal corporations, corporations or associations in trust for
such purposes, whether such trust appears on the face of the instrument mak-
ing such gift, devise, or bequest or not, such will as to such gift, devise, or be-
quest, shall be invalid unless it was executed at least one year prior to the
death of the testator. Ibid.
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6, 1965,' Ohio has joined Montana in category four by Imposing
restrictions on the amount that can be devised or bequeathed to
charity within a prescribed period of time before testator's death.
This important change in the Ohio statute, the first significant
one in over 113 years, makes it appropriate to discuss some of the
implications and changes which arise under the recent amendment!
I. HISTORY OF MORTMAIN STATUTES
Statutes restricting testamentary gifts, while customarily termed
mortmain acts in America, have no significant identification with
the English statutes of mortmam. The earliest mention of mort-
main was in the forty-third clause of Henry III's Second Charter
(1217), which sought to prevent gifts to religious corporations on
the grounds that they were fraudulent and intended to deny the lord
his apparent right to his feudal obligations.' In addition, convey-
ances of property to charitable and religious corporations endowed
with perpetuity interfered with free alienation of land and prevented
escheats to the crown.1"
Although the Wills Act of 1837" repealed the existing prohi-
bition against corporations taking by devise, its effectiveness was
diluted by the Statute of Mortmain and Charitable Uses.' This lat-
ter statute prohibited a gift or conveyance of real or personal prop-
erty "to or upon any person or body corporate or politic, in trust for
the benefit of any charitable uses whatever, except by deed properly
executed within twelve months before the death of the donor."'13
Although the influence of the English laws aimed at free alien-
ation may have given rise to similar legislation in the colonies, the
English statutes themselves were never in force on this side of the
Atlantic.'4 The state law which came closest to the English statutes
was the early Mississippi Constitution which unequivocally pro-
7 OIo REv. CoDE § 2107.06.
8 The author of this artide has previously written on this subject. See Note, Tbe
Mortmaun Statute - A Need for Reform, 13 W RES. L REV. 576 (1962).
9 TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 101-02 (10th ed.
1946).
10 Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 465, 495 (1860).
117 Will. 4 & 1 Via. c. 26.
12 1736, 9 George II, c. 36.
13 HOLLISON, WILLS 306-07 (1939).
14 The English case of Attorney General v. Stewart, 2 Met. 143, 35 Eng. Rep. 895
(1817), held that none of the English mortmain acts were in force in the colonies.
See Penn v. Carney, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 465, 499 (1860)
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hibited all devises and bequests for charitable purposes. 5 If these
laws were ever considered to exist in Ohio before 1806, it could only
have been by resolution of the territorial governors and judges.'"
The reason for restricting gifts by will for charitable purposes
in the United States was in part the fear that free alienation of lands
would be curtailed, but was mainly to protect certain classes of the
testator's relatives from being excluded from his will by improvi-
dent gifts made to charitable institutions while under the apprehen-
sion of impending death.'
The actual purpose of the Ohio statute is still subject to some
doubt. However, a full analysis of the Ohio law to date leaves little
doubt that the effect of the statute is not primarily to protect the
heirs of the testator, but to declare void as against public policy gifts
within the purview of the previous statute and now the present
amended act.'"
II. THE OHIO MORTMAIN ACT
The Ohio mortmain statute had its origin in 1874 when the leg-
islature amended the Wills Act of 1852."9 This original amend-
ment of 1874 has survived without substantial change until the
present tume when the legislature deemed it time to liberalize our
statute.
The new statute, as reproduced from the Enrolled Bill, provides:
Sec. 2107.06 (A) If a testator dies leaving issue *** and ***
by his will *** devises *** or bequeaths *** his estate, or any
part thereof, in trust or otherwise to *** any municipal corpo-
raton, county, state, country, or subdivision thereof, for any pur-
pose whatsoever, or to any person, association, or corporation for
the use or benefit of one or more benevolent, religious, education-
al, or charitable *** purposes, such dewses and bequests shall be
*** valid in their entirety only if the testator's will was executed
*** more than six months prior to the death of the testator. If
such will was executed within six months of the testator's death,
such devises and bequests shall be valid to the extent they do not
in the aggregate exceed twenty-five per cent of the value of the
15Prior to 1940, the Mississippi Constitution, art. 14, §§ 269-70, prohibited un-
equivocally all devises and bequests for charitable purposes.
16 Case law reveals no particular enactment of the English mortmain laws in the
Northwest Territory. See Penn v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 465, 500 (1860).
17 In re Lennon's Estate, 152 Cal. 327, 92 Pac. 870 (1907); Taylor v. Payne, 154
Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615 (1944); In the Matter of Franklin Nat'l Bank, 4 Misc. 2d
410, 147 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Ruple v. Hiram College, 35 Ohio App. 8,
171 NE. 417 (1928).
1 8 See Note, supra note 8, at 578.
1950 Ohio Laws 297 (1852), as amended, 72 Ohio Laws 3 (1875).
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testator's net probate estate, and in the event the aggregate of the
devises and bequests exceeds twenty-five per cent thereof, such
devises and bequests shall be abated proportionately so that the
aggregate thereof equals twenty-five per cent of the value of the
testator's net probate estate.
(B) The execution of a codicil to the testator's will within
six months of his death shall not affect the validity of any such
devises and bequests made by will or codicil executed more than
six months prior to his death, except as the same are revoked or
modified by the codicil. If a codicil executed within such period
increases the aggregate of such devises and bequests to more than
twenty-five per cent of the value of the testator's net probate es-
tate, such increase by codicil is invalidated to the extent that such
increases, plus the aggregate contained in the will and not re-
voked by the codicil, exceeds twenty-five per cent of the value of
the testator's net probate estate; and the amount of the codicil's in-
crease of each such devise and bequest in the will and each such
devise and bequest contained in the codicil which was not con-
tained in the will shall be abated proportionately.
(C) The portion of any such devises and bequests which is
invalid under this section shall be distributed per strpes among
such testator's issue unless expressly otherwise provided in the will
or codicil.
(D) As used in this section, "the value of the testator's net
probate estate' means the probate inventory value of all the tes-
tator's assets which are subject to the jurisdiction of the probate
court, less all debts and costs and expenses of administration, but
prior to the payment of any estate or inheritance taxes, and "is-
sue" means a child or children, including an adopted child or
adopted children, and their lineal descendants.
Under the amendme2nt, four factors must be present before the
Ohio mortmain statute can operate: (1) the decedent must die
testate; (2) within six months of making his will; (3) survived by
issue, be they natural or adopted children or their lineal descendants;
and (4) have left gifts outright or in trust to charities the aggregate
of which is more than twenty-five per cent of the net probate es-
tate.2 0  Where all of these conditions exist, devises or bequests to
charities, either outright or in trust for charitable uses, are invali-
dated to the extent they exceed twenty-five per cent of the net pro-
bate estate; that in excess of twenty-five per cent passes per stirpes
among the testator's issue unless otherwise provided in the testator's
will. This result is different from that under the former statute
where the charitable gift, if a specific or general devise or bequest,
lapsed and passed into the residuary clause of the testator's will.2'
2 0 OHIO REv. CODE § 2107.06.
21 Davis v. Hutchings, 15 Ohio C.C.R. 174 (1897), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., Davis v. Davis, 62 Ohio St. 411, 57 N.E. 317 (1900)
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Where there was no residuary clause,22 or the gift itself consisted of
the entire residuary clause of the will," the gift passed as intestate
property to the heirs at law pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section
2105.06. Where the gift represented merely a portion of the resi-
due it was divided up among the remaining residuary beneficiaries.24
IH. THE PRESENT AND PREVIOUS OHIO MORTMAIN STATUTES
COMPARED TO THE STATUTES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Changes as to Time
The previous Ohio statute25 provided that charitable gifts were
"invalid" if the testator died within a year of making his will, and
was survived by one of the parties enumerated in the statute. The
severest criticism of this old law was the one-year time limitation.
Under the amended law testamentary gifts to charity made
in a will executed more than six months from death are valid in their
entirety.2" While such amendment reduces the time period from
one year to six months during which an absolute presumption of
undue influence is deemed to exist, the statute still remains harsh
in comparison with states that provide limitations of ninety days,
thirty days,2 8 or no limitation whatsoever 9
B. Change as to Amount
The previous Ohio statute, like those of the District of Colum-
bia, Florida, and Pennsylvania, placed no restriction on the amount
which could be given to charitable institutions in wills made prior
to the time limitation.3 ° The statute merely stated that all gifts to
22Daws v. Davis, supra note 21, held that where the residuary clause was limited
to the "balance" of the testator s estate, that it was limited in nature, and gifts which
were invalid by operation of the mortmain act, passed as intestate property to the heirs
of testator.
23 Morgan v. First Nat'l Bank, 84 Ohio App. 345, 84 N.E.2d 612 (1948).
2 4 Commerce Natl Bank v. Browning, 158 Ohio St. 54, 107 N.E.2d 120 (1952).
25 114 Ohio Laws 320, 346 (1932).
2 6 OIO REV. CODE 5 2107.06.
27 GA. CODE ANN. 5 113-107 (1959); Miss. CODE ANN. § 671 (1942), (ninety
days).
2 8 D.C. CODE ANN. 5 19-202 (1961); CAL. PROB. CODE § 41; IDAHO CODE ANN.
5 14-326 (Amended 1965); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20 § 180.7 (1950) (thirty days).
20IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.266 (revised 1963); NEW YORK DECED. EST. LAW
5 17 (no time limitation)
30 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-202 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19 (Supp.
1961); 114 Ohio Laws 320, 346 (1932); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (1950).
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charity, regardless of amount, were invalid if contained in a will
executed within a year of the testator's death."'
The amendment 2 provides that a testator may give by will at
least twenty-five per cent of his net probate estate to charity
regardless of when his will is executed. The amended statute is
similar to the provision of the Montana Code dealing with limta-
tions on testamentary gifts to charity"
C. Effect of Gift to Charity Made in Codicil
Under the previous statute there was a dearth of cases dealing
with the effect of a codicil upon charitable gifts made in a will.
However, there is no question that such charitable gifts in a codicil
were controlled by the previous Ohio mortmain statute. As stated
in Newman v'. Newman: 4
section 2107.01 provides that in Chapters 2101 to 2131, eclu-
sive, of the Code, the word 'will' includes codicils. As a conse-
quence, a codicil is subject to the restrictions of Section 2107.06,
invalidating charitable bequests made by a will executed within a
year of the testator's death. 85
In the case of Ruple v, Hiram College,6 the testator in his will
provided, in part, for a $10,000 bequest to an individual, and the
residue of his estate to be divided between two charities. By a
codicil executed within one year of his death, the $10,000 bequest
was revoked. It was argued that the $10,000 bequest should pass
as intestate property since it would otherwise go to the charities
who were residual beneficaaries under the will. The court in finding
that the Ohio mortmain statute did not apply, stated: "Not only
does the spirit of the section referred to fail to condemn the codicil,
but the letter of the statute likewise fails so to do ,37
The latest case, under the prior statute, decided by Dean Fletcher
Andrews,8" involved a situation where a testator executed a codicil
within a year of his death wherein he specifically revoked an item
in his will which left certain bequests to individuals and charities,
3' 114 Ohio laws 320, 346, (1932)
3 2 OHIO REv. CODE § 2107.06(B).
-
3 3 MOrr. REv. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947) (thirty day limitation and one third
maximum).
34 199 N.E.2d 904 (Ohio P. Ct. 1964)
351d. at 907-08.
36 35 Ohio App. 8, 171 N.E. 417 (1928)
.37d. at 13, 171 N.E. at 418.
38Newman v. Newman, 199 N.E.2d 904 (Ohio P. Ct. 1964)
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and substituted a new provision in Is codicil leaving a lesser
amount to different individuals, and more to the same charities.
In holding that the Ouo mortmain statute applied and that the
gifts to charities were void, Dean Andrews stated:
I hold that the charitable bequests in Mr. Newman's will were un-
conditionally revoked by the codicil, and that the charitable be-
quests in the codicil are invalid by reason of section 2107.06, Re-
vised Code.89
If there was any confusion arising from the decisions of the
courts regarding the effect of the statute on codicils, the legislature
in the amended statute sought to put an end to it by specifically
providing for codicils executed within the statutory limitation
period. Section 2107.06, as amended, provides that a codicil ex-
ecuted within six months of the decedent's death will have no effect
upon charitable gifts made in a will or codicil executed more than
six months from the decedent's death unless the codicil revokes
or modifies those gifts. Charitable gifts made in a codicil are
invalid only insofar as they, together with those made in the will
or other codicils, exceed twenty-five per cent of the net distributable
estate of the testator.4" If either additional or new charitable gifts
in a codicil cause the twenty-five per cent limit to be exceeded, then
the gifts in the codicil abate proportionately."'
Thus, had the Newman case4 2 been decided under the amended
statute, the charitable gifts as provided in the codicil would have
been valid up to twenty-five per cent of the net probate estate.
D. Change n Protected Partzes
Under the previous statute,48 charitable gifts which were invalid
under the Ohio mortmain statute could have mured to the benefit
of strangers, such as residuary beneficiaries, even though the object
of the statute was to protect the testator's issue. As the court said
in the Ruple case," "it is apparent therefore that, while this section
may mcdentally inure to the benefit of others, the object of the
statute is to protect the testator's direct issue ,,45
39 Id. at 911.
4 OHio REV. CODE § 2107.06.
41 bId.
42199 NE.2d 904 (Ohio P. Ct. 1964).
43 114 Ohio Laws 320, 346 (1932).
4 4 Ruple v. Hiram College, 35 Ohio App. 8, 171 NXE. 417 (1928).
45Id. at 12, 171 NE. at 418.
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The present amendment, however, specifically provides that
"the portion of any such devises and bequests which is invalid
under this section shall be distributed per stirpes among such testa-
tor's issue unless expressly otherwise provided in the will or codi-
cil." 6 Thus, in no event could an individual, including a residuary
beneficiary, other than issue of the testator, benefit from the in-
validity of charitable gifts unless the testator stated in his will that
in the event of the applicability of the Ohio mortmain statute the
invalid gifts should pass to others than his issue. 7
E. Changes in the Area of Voui and Vouable Gifts
In determining whether a testamentary gift is void or voidable
under a particular mortmain act, one writer has concluded that
under those statutes which enumerate parties who must survive the
testator, the gifts are voidable, while under those that do not, the
gifts are void.4 1 While such a conclusion seems logical and prac-
tical, a reading of the Pennsylvania statute49 which does not
enumerate parties who must survive the testator, and a study of the
case law in Ohio, where the statute does enumerate parties, leads
one to the conclusion that such a categorical generalization is falla-
cious. If the testamentary gift to charity is void, then it automatically
fails at the death of the testator. However, if the gift is merely void-
able, then it fails only if one of the parties protected under the
statute objects; if no such objection is made, the statute is deemed
waived, and the charitable bequest is valid.
Of the eleven jurisdictions which have mortmain statutes, Ohio's
previous statute appears to be the only one under which both the
"void" and "voidable" positions found acceptance. This confusing
situation resulted from the lower courts' propensity to hold gifts
voidable in contravention of the Ohio Supreme Court's rulings that
such gifts are void. All of the other jurisdictions have apparently
resolved their problems either by statutory amendment or unequi-
vocal judicial interpretation.
F Vout-Voutable Confusion in the Ohio Act
When the Ohio mortmain act was passed in 1874 as an amend-
ment to the Wills Act of 1852,5" it was specifically provided
46 OHIo REv. CODE § 2107.06.
17 Ibid.
4 8 Note, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 94 (1950).
49 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (1950).
50 50 Ohio Laws 297 (1852), as amended, 72 Ohio laws 3 (1875).
[Vol. 17:83
OHIO MORTMAIN STATUTE
that charitable gifts made within the prohibited time period were
"invalid and voud." When this act was printed in 1874 as section
5915, Revised Statutes, it was entitled "any bequest or devise to
charitable purpose, if any issue of testator living, void, unless made
one year before his death." However, it is interesting to note that
when the body of the statute was printed the words "and void"
for some reason disappeared so that it provided only that charitable
gifts within one year of the testator's death were "invalid." It can-
not be discovered where or why those words were omitted; it is
mere conjecture that they were so omitted either because of redun-
dancy, or because of the desire to change the meaning of the section.
Semantically, there is no difference between the word "invalid"
and the word "void." Subsequent sections of the Ohio General
Code,52 and section 2107.06 of the Ohio Revised Code, prior to
amendment, state only that the gifts are "invalid."
(1) Supreme Court Decisions Construing Gifts Under the Pre-
vious Statute as Voi.--Certamly it is questionable whether the omis-
sion of the word "void" from the statute prior to amendment has
caused the apparent disagreement among the Oho courts as to
whether a gift was void or voidable. In Patton v. Patton,5" the Ohio
Supreme Court in 1883, held that the charitable bequests under the
mortmain statute made within a year of the death of the testator
"became absolutely void immediately at and after the death of the
testator."54 Some difficulty was subsequently caused in the cases
of The Trustees of Ohio State University v. Folsom,55 an 1897 de-
cision, and Thomas v. The Trustees of Ohio State University,6
which was decided in 1904. Both of these cases dealt with the
construction of a will left by the same testator who died within a
year of executing his will and codicil. In his will the testator made
a devise to Ohio State Umversity, but provided that if for any reason
the gift should fail, it would then pass to the children of his
brothers. In his subsequent codicil, the testator gave his daughter
the power to appoint the devise to the Umversity if it became void
under the mortmain statute, thereby cutting off the gift to the
children of his brothers. At the death of the testator within a year of
5172 Ohio Laws 3 (1875).
52 114 Ohio Laws 320, 346 (1928) [OHio GEN. CODE §§ 10504, 10504-5.]
53 39 Ohio St. 590 (1883)
5 4 Note, Tbe Ohm Mortmam Statute - A Need for Reform, 13 W Rns. L. REv.
576,583 (1962).
55 56 Ohio St 701, 47 N.E. 581 (1897).
56 70 Ohio St. 92, 70 N.E. 896 (1904).
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making his will and codicil, his daughter exercised her power of ap-
pointment. The supreme court held that the power to appoint did
not fall within the purview of the statute, and the devise went to the
university. The discussion by the court of the power to waive the
statute caused confusion in later cases.
The cases of Davis v Davis," decided in 1900, and in Theobald
v Fugman,"8 decided in 1901, both held that gifts made within the
statutory period were void. The case of Barrett v Delmore, in
1944, did not consider the "void" versus "voidable" issue but dealt
solely with the issue of whether a designated heir was within the
classes specified by the statute as surviving the testator.
If there was any doubt created as to whether charitable gifts
were void or voidable under the previous Ohio statute, the supreme
court in 1951 in Kirkbride v. Hickok," seemed to have answered
it."' In Kirkbrzde, the testator had died within a year of making his
will. The will placed his entire estate in trust for twenty years,
with provision for the payment of income during such period to
his children and certain other persons. At the end of twenty years,
the trust was to terminate and be divided among some twenty chari-
ties. An in terrorem clause in the will provided that the children
would forfeit all their interests if they contested the provisions of
the will. This put the controversy of "void" versus "voidable"
squarely in issue. If the gifts were voidable, then action by the
children would involve the on terrorem clause,62 while maction
would constitute a waiver of the statute's provisions." On the other
hand if the gift were void, then action by the children would not
invoke the in terrorem clause, because the gift would fail automati-
cally at the death of the testator.64 The court in holding that the
gifts were void, stated:
The language of this section is clear and unambiguous. Invalid
5762 Ohio St. 411, 57 N.E. 317 (1900)
586 4 Ohio St. 473, 60 N.E. 606 (1901)
59 143 Ohio St. 203, 54 N.E.2d 789 (1944).
60 155 Ohio St. 293, 98 N.E.2d 815 (1951)
61 For criticism of this case as going beyond the statutory purposes, see Note, 65
HIARv. L. REV. 1074 (1952)
02 The result here would be that the other beneficiaries would receive the entire
income for twenty years and the children would have a vested remainder.
63 The result here would be the same as the provisions of the will, that is, the chil-
dren and other beneficiaries would receive the income for twenty years, and the char-
ities receive a vested remainder in the principal.
64The result here, as determined by the court in the Kirkbrde case, was that the
children and other beneficiaries received the income for twenty years, and the children
had a vested remainder.
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means void, or without validity, and it seems obvious that if chil-
dren of the blood take under the will just as it provides, and have
done nothing themselves to bring about the invalidity of the be-
quests to the charities, they can not be said to have waived the pro-
.visions of the statute.
The court went on to distinguish the Thomas case and the Folsom
case on the ground that the naked power to appoint is not covered by
the statute. 5
(2) Lower Court Cases Construing Gifts Under the Previous
Statute as Vordable.-The conflict in the Ohio position as to the
"void versus voidable" question arises from two probate court
decisions." The first of these two probate court decisions, Deeds v.
Deeds,"t decided in Montgomery County in 1950, involved a devise
by codicil to Denison University which failed because the codicil was
executed within a year of the date of testatrx's death. The testatrix's
husband was the residuary beneficiary under her will, and her son
was the:substitute residuary beneficiary if her husband failed to sur-
vive the testatrix. After testatrix's death, her son signed a waiver
relinquishing and disclaiming. his rights under the statute to the
property devised to the charity. I, a will construction action filed
by the husband as executor, the court held that the gift was voidable
rather than void. Accordingly, the court said the son, who was a
protected party under the statute, had by his waiver effectuated the
gift to the University. The case was never appealed.
The second case, Ireland v. Cleveland Trust Company,"8 decided
in 1958 by Judge Walter Kinder of the Probate Court of Cuyahoga
County, involved a devise of over a $1,500,000 to charity. Testa-
trix was survived by her son, the sole heir at law and residuary
legatee under her will, who was willing to waive the benefits
of the statute if a waiver was legally possible. The court,
"distinguishing" the Kirkbrde case without elaboration, held that
the law of Ohio permitted and authorized a waiver, and therefore
65 Subsequent to the Kirkbride case, the court of appeals of Mahoning County, Ohio,
decided the case of Roenick v. Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 179 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1960). In that case the testator, within the year of his death, drafted a will leav-
ing the residue to his grandson on the condition that he pay sums of money to certain
charities. The court upheld the gift of the residue to the grandson, but without citation
of authority, held that the condition was invalid as coming within "the plain, and un-
ambiguous, terms" of the mortmain act.
66 Ireland v. Cleveland Trust Co., 157 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio P. Ct. 1958); Deeds v.
Deeds, 94 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio P. Ct. 1950). Cf. Estate of William A. Carey, 9 T.C.
1047 (1947); Estate of Dudley S. Blossom, 45 B.T.A. 691 (1941)
67 94 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio P. Ct. 1950).
08 157 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio P Ct. 1958).
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the gift to charity was valid. This case, as the Deeds case, was
never appealed, and thus both appear to have been friendly law-
suits, anned perhaps at saving taxes. 9  Both of these cases are con-
trary to the law as interpreted by the supreme court, for the Ohio
statute prior to amendment and the weight of case law interpreting
it are clear in holding that testamentary gifts made in prohibition of
the statute are void as against public policy"0
(3) Result Under the Amendment.-It was hoped that the
amended statute would correct the inequity of declaring a gift void if
made within the statutory time period, and thereby permit persons
who would benefit from the invalidity of the mortmain statute
to waive its provisions and permit the charities to benefit if the
heirs so desired. The original bill as presented to the legislature
contained the following provision.
Any such issue who would receive any of the testator's estate by rea-
son of the provisions of the preceding sentence may renounce such
distributive share by filing in the Probate Court having jurisdic-
tion of the administration of such testator's estate, within three
months of the approval by the Court of the inventory of the tes-
tator's assets, a written renunciation of such distributive share. On
a motion filed before the expiration of such three months and for
good cause shown, the Court may allow further time for the filing
of the renunciation. Each such renunciation shall restore such
devises and bequests effective as of the date of death to the extent
of the value of the distributive share being renounced. If such
renunciations are filed by all such issue, such devises and bequests
shall be valid in their entirety.71
69 See Millard v. Humprey, 8 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Wash. 1934), alf'd, 79 F.2d
107 (2d Cir. 1935); Estate of William A. Carney, 9 T.C. 1047 (1947); Estate of Dud-
ley S. Blossom, 45 B.T.A. 691 (1941) Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 2055 (a)
provides:
In General - For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value
of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the
gross estate the amount of all bequests, legacies, devises, or transfers (includ-
ing the interest which falls into any such bequest, legacy, or power, if the dis-
claimer is made before the date prescribed for the filing of the return)
(2) to or for the use of any corporation organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes.
Thus, if a waiver of a charitable bequest is valid, there is a substantial savings in estate
tax, for the amount of the charitable bequest can be deducted from the estate before
computing the estate tax.
70 The theory that such testamentary gifts are void as against public policy is suc-
cinctly set forth in Kirkbride v. Hickok, 155 Ohio St. 293, 300, 98 N.E.2d 815, 819,
(1951), as follows: "In none of those cases has the statute been treated otherwise
than as a limitation on the power of the testator to make charitable bequests, where the
testator dies within a year after making his will, and all hold that property so devised
or bequeathed does not under such circumstances pass to charitable institutions."
71 S. 24, 106th General Assembly, Regular Session, 1965-66.
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However, the Ohio House of Representatives by amendment struck
this provision from the bill for the reason that to permit a
waiver of the statute would subject the issue of the testator to a
great deal of pressure from the charities and other issue who desired
to waive the statute.
As a result of the failure to include this provision in the present
statute, there is clearly no right to waive the effect of the statute.
The gifts within the prohibited tune period are void ab initio in
the same manner as they were under the Ohio Supreme Court's
interpretation of the old statute.
IV DOCTRINES PERMITTING AVOIDANCE OF
THE HARSH EFFECTS OF MORTMAIN ACTs
A number of doctrines which reduce the hardship of the mort-
main statutes have been incorporated into statutes or adopted by
judicial decision. One of these is the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation. Another is the doctrine of independent legal signifi-
cance.
7 2
A. Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation operates where
the testator has executed a will prior to the statutory tune limitation
set forth in a particular mortmain act leaving gifts to charity, and
later, during the statutory time period, executes a new will or
codicil which either expressly or impliedly revokes or modifies
the prior will, and which names the same or similar charity and
gives the same or different amounts of money to those charities.
As previously discussed, the gifts made to charities within the pro-
hibited time periods are void or voidable if left to charity, and the
requisites of the particular statutes have been met. However, the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation operates to validate the
charitable gifts in the prior will on the ground that it was the
testator's intention that the revocation of the gift in the prior will
be conditioned upon the validity of the subsequent will or gifts. 3
Further, if the gifts are invalid under the second will, the condition
has not been met, and thus the gifts under the prior will are still
72 Further statutory aids to charities are provided in the Florida and Georgia statutes.
FLA. STAT. ANN. S 731.19 (1964), requires that those persons named within it must
file notice within eight months after the death of the testator in order to invoke its pro-
tection. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-107 (1959), provides that when the estate exceeds
$200,000 the restrictions shall not apply to the excess.
73 See Annot., 28 A.LR.2d 526, 532 (1953).
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in effect. This is succinctly stated by the court in In re Kaufman's
Estate: 4
Under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, an earlier will,
revoked only to give effect to a later one on the supposition that
the later one will become effective, remains in effect to the extent
that the later proves ineffective. The doctrine is designed to
carry out the probable intention of the testator when there is no
reason to suppose that he intended to revoke his earlier will if the
later will became inoperative.
The various courts which apply the doctrine of dependent rela-
tive revocation to such situations have adopted different standards.
Thus, some courts75 refuse to apply the doctrine where there is an
express clause of revocation, stating that such a clause is controlling.
Others7" will apply the doctrine even when the revocation clause
has been inserted, stating that the intention of the testator is para-
mount to the words used in his will. Further, where the second
will contains no express clause of revocation, but the clauses of the
second will are inconsistent with those of the first, the courts are
split in decision. Some of the courts have held that the second will
does not revoke the first, since it is truly the inconsistency between
the gifts in the two instruments which affords any grounds for
claiming revocation, and since the gifts in the second will are not
operative, the first instrument is not affected by the second. Other
courts hold that the testator intends to revoke the first instrument,
as is indicated by the inconsistent gifts in the second instrument,
and effect must be given to this intention even though the gifts
which are made by the second instrument cannot take effect.77
The application of the doctrine can best be illustrated by several
cases. In In re Kaufman's Estate78 the testator, upon moving from
New York to Califorma, drafted a new will revoking all his former
wills. This new will named the same charitable beneficiaries as
did his former will and provided for identical cash bequests. The
only substantial change was the naming of a new executor. The
testator died within thirty days of the execution of this new will.
7425 Cal. 2d 854, 858-59, 155 P.2d 831, 833 (1945)
75 See, e.g., Ely v. Megie, 219 N.Y. 112, 113 N.E. 800 (1916).
76 iUnkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir.
1950); In re Kaufman's Estate, 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (1945); Blackford v.
Anderson, 226 Iowa 1138, 286 N.W 735 (1939); McCuigen's Estate, 388 Pa. 475,
131 A.2d 124 (1957). See also I& re Blankenship s Estate, 122 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1960);
Wilbourn v. Shell, 59 Miss. 205 (1881).
77 2 PAGE, WiLts § 21.57 (rev. ed. 1960).
7825 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (1945).
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Under California law, testamentary gifts to charity are invalid if
the will providing for them was executed within thirty days of the
testator's death. The California court, applying the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation, sustained the gifts to charity under
the prior will stating:
When a testator repeats the same dispositive plan in a new will,
revocation of the old one by the new is deemed inseparably related
to and dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the new.79
In the case of Lznktns v. Protestant Eptscopal Cathedral Founda-
tin,° the testator executed a second will revoking his first will, but
provided in the residuary clause of the second for distribution to the
same charities as in the residuary clause of the first. The testator
died within one month of executing his second will, making. such
charitable bequests void under the District of Columbia Code. The
court of appeals, citing the Kaufman case with approval, applied
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation to uphold the gifts
and stated:
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is basically an appli-
cation of the rule that a testator's intention governs; it is not a
doctrine defeating that intent.81
The same result was reached by an Iowa court in Blackford v.
Anderson,2 holding that the doctrine of dependent relative revoca-
tion was applicable so as to give effect to the thrice declared intent
of the testator.
Several states have, by statute, incorporated into their mortmain
acts the doctrine of dependent relative revocation in order to avoid
the effects of the mortmain provisions. Thus, in 1957, as a result
of In re Estate of Pratt," in which a Florida court refused to apply
the doctrine in a case similar to the Kaufman and Lnkn decisions
where a subsequent will revoked all prior wills of the testator, the
Florida Legislature amended secton 731.19 of its statutes to prpvide
that charitable gifts are not voided if the
testator, by his will duly executed immediately next prior to such
last will and more than six months before his death, made a valid
charitable bequest or devise in substantially the same amount for
the same purpose or to the same beneficiary, or to a person in
79Id. at 860, 155 P.2d at 834.
80 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
sl Id. at 360.
82 226 Iowa 1138, 286 N.W 735 (1939).
83 88 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1956).
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trust for the same person or beneficiary as was made in such last
will.8 4
Another comprehensive incorporation of the doctrine into a
mortmain statute was accomplished by Pennsylvania in section
180.7 of its statutes. This section provides in part:
Unless the testator directs otherwise, if such a will or codicil shall
revoke or supersede a prior will or codicil executed at least thirty
days before the testator's death, and not theretofore revoked or
superseded and the original of which can be produced in legible
condition, and if each instrument shall contain an identical gift for
substantially the same religious or charitable purpose, the gift in
the later will or codicil shall be valid; or if each instrument shall
give for substantially the same religious or charitable purpose a
cash legacy or a share of the residuary estate or a share of the same
asset, payable immediately or subject to identical prior estates and
conditions, the later gift shall be valid to the extent to which it
shall not exceed the prior gift.85
Following the amendment of the Pennsylvania statute, McGui-
gen Estate'8 was decided. There, the testator died five days after
executing a new will which specifically revoked all prior wills.
This new will left all the residue absolutely to a charity, while a
former will executed more than thirty days prior to decedent's death
had left all the residue in trust for the same charity. The court in
upholding the charitable gift stated:
Prior to the Act of 1947 the law of Pennsylvania was clearly set-
tled that the residuary gift contained in testatrix s last will of 1955
was void [because of testatix's death within 30 days]. The
reason for the law prior to 1947 was clear: The basic purpose
of the 30 day requirement was and is to prevent a testator during
his last illness from being importuned or otherwise influenced, by
hope of reward or fear of punishment in the hereafter, to leave
his estate in whole or in part to charity or to church. Since it
would often be difficult to prove whether a man was in his last ill-
ness, or whether he had been importuned, or was unduly influenced
by charity or church, or was influenced while in extremis by a sud-
den hope of Heaven or fear of Hades, the Legislature wisely es-
tablished a clear, realistic and inflexible time period - 30 days.
However, society came to realize that gifts to charity or church
which were made within the last 30 days of a man's life were not
always unduly influenced by charity or church and that the law
was unfair to testators, charity and church alike for the above men-
tioned reason, as well as because of the fact that while in good
health a testator might die in a motor, railroad or plane accident
within 30 days after making his will. The Legislature therefore
84 FiA. STAT. ANN. 5 731.19 (1964)
85 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (1950).
86 388 Pa. 475, 131 A.2d 124 (1957).
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decided that the prior statutory law in re charitable gifts should
be modified and liberalized and that gifts to charities which were
made within 30 days of death should, at least to a limited extent,
be protected and validated where the testator had made a substan-
tially identical charitable gift in a prior extant will. 7
Thus, the Pennsylvania Legislature came to recognize some of
the inherent problems which resulted from a harsh and antiquated
law and corrected them by adopting a modern and liberal approach.
But, while California, District of Columbia, Iowa, Florida, Mis-
sissippi, and Pennsylvania, by decision or statute, have adopted to
a greater or lesser degree the doctrine of dependent relative revoca-
tion to ease the burden of their mortmam acts, the Ohio Supreme
Court in the recent case of Jewish Welfare Federation v. Cleveland
Trust Co., " refused to apply the doctrine. Such a refusal is certainly
not inconsistent with the harsh position taken by the Ohio courts
in rebuffing any attempt to modify the effects of its mortmain
statute.
B. Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance
While all apparent attempts to modify the effect of the Ohio
mortmain act on testamentary dispositions 9 have been thwarted
by the Ohio courts and Legislature, the Ohio courts have held that
inter vivos trusts with charitable beneficiaries are not void if created
within a year of a testator's death.9" Because of this approach the
implications of Ohio Revised Code section 2107.63, may cause some
surprising results.
Formerly, where a testator provided in his will that the residue
of his estate "pour over" into a pre-existing inter vivos trust, for
such a gift to be valid, the trust had to be incorporated by reference,
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 2107.05, into the testator's
will.9 Any subsequent amendments to the trust also had to be
87 Id. at 477-79, 131 A.2d at 126-27.
88 Civ. No. 554490, Ohio P. Ct. Cuyahoga County (July 1, 1960), aff'd, Civ. No.
25339, Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County (1961), motion to certify overruled, 34 OHio
BAR 1073 (Oct. 4, 1961) (No. 37084).
89 Kirkbride v. Hickok, 155 Ohio St. 293, 98 N.E.2d 815 (1951); Barrett v. Del-
more, 143 Ohio St. 203,54 N.E.2d 789 (1944); Davis v. Davis, 62 Ohio St. 411,57 N.E.
317 (1900); Patton v. Patton, 39 Ohio St. 590 (1883); Roenick v. Dollar Sav. & Trust
Co., 179 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); Morgan v. First Nat'l Bank, 84 Ohio
App. 345, 84 N.B.2d 612 (1948); Harrison v. Hillegas, 1 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Rep.)
160 (P. Ct. 1939).
90 Drew v. Richards, 177 N.E.2d 633 (Olo Ct. App. 1960); Cleveland Trust Co.
v. White, 58 Ohio App. 339, 16 N.E.2d 588 (1937), ajfd, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d
627 (1938).
91Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944).
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incorporated into the testator's will by codicil for the property
passing from the estate into the trust to go according to the terms
of the trust as amended. 2 Thus, in Cleveland Trust Co. v. White,93
decided prior to Ohio Revised Code section 2107.63, and pursuant
to Ohio Revised Code section 2107.05, where the testator created
an inter vivos trust within a year of the date of his death with
charitable beneficiaries and incorporated the same by reference into
his will executed thereafter, the court held that while the property
transferred during his life to the trust passed to charity, property
which passed into the trust from testator's will did not pass to charity
because the same was a testamentary disposition within the prohibi-
tion of the mortmain act.
However, with the passage of section 2107.63 in 1963, the Ohio
Legislature recognized the doctrine of "independent legal signifi-
cance," which provides in substance that an inter vivos trust stands
independently of a will of a testator, and that once the trust has been
referred to in the will, subsequent amendments to the trust do not
have to be referred to in the will.94 The result of this doctrine is
that, without testamentary disposition, the residue of the testator's
estate "pours over" into his inter vivos trust as amended.
The doctrine of independent legal significance coupled with the
approach of the Oho courts in upholding inter vivos trusts for the
benefit of charities produces an interesting result which can be il-
lustrated as follows: X draws a will in July of 1961 and provides
therein that the residue of his estate shall "pour over" into P inter
vivos trust created in June of 1961, X amends his trust in January
of 1962 by changing the beneficiaries to charitable institutions with-
out changing hIs will; if X dies in March of 1962, the gifts to the
charities are valid, even if X is survived by issue, adopted children,
or lineal descendants thereof, because the amendment of his trust is
not a testamentary disposition so as to come within the purview of
the old statute as well as the new section 2107.06. In. reality what
the testator is doing is devising or bequeathing property to charity
and accomplishing such during the time period prior to his death.
Whether the Ohio Legislature was aware of this interesting re-
sult when it passed Oho Revised Code section 2107.63 is a matter
of conjecture.
92 Koensnger v. Toledo Trust Co., 44 Ohio App., 490, 197 N-. 419 (1934)
93 58 Ohio App. 339, 16 NE.2d 588 (1937)
9 4 OHIo REV. CODE § 2107.63 (Supp. 1964)
[Vol. 17:83
OHIO MORTMAIN STATUTE
V CONCLUSION
The amended mortmain statute represents an important step
forward in the liberalization and clarification of Ohio's attitude to-
ward testamentary gifts to charity. Four major changes were incor-
porated into the new law- (1) the time during which an absolute
prohibition exists on testamentary gifts to charity has been reduced
from one year to six months; (2) charities are permitted to receive
up to twenty-five per cent of the testator's net distributable estate
under wills executed within the prohibited time period; (3) only
issue of the testator, adopted children, or lineal descendants of either
are permitted to benefit from the invalidity of the charitable gifts;
(4) the effect of charitable gifts made in codicils has been specifi-
cally set forth in the new law.
While the foregoing changes in the mortmain law have cured
many of the inequities which existed under the prior law, testamen-
tary gifts to charity within the prohibited time period are still void
if in excess of twenty-five per cent of the testator's net probate es-
tate. In addition, those persons who would benefit from the invalid-
ity of the gifts have no right to renounce their windfall in favor
of the designated charities if they so choose.
It is hoped that the amendment to section 2107.06 of the Ohio
Revised Code is but a first step towards a complete abolition of the
Ohio mortmain statute which would place charitable beneficiaries
on an equal footing with other testamentary recipients.
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